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THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA

RONALD

J.

YALEM t

N FEBRUARY, 1958, representatives from eighty-six nations assembled at Geneva for the purpose of codifying the international
law of the sea. They met for three months and in April, 1958 completed work on four conventions involving: (1) the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, (2) the High Seas, (3) Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and (4) the Continental Shelf. The progress achieved in codifying the law of nations
in the vital area of sea law represents an important milestone in the
clarification of previously existing ambiguities. Yet the problem of
the limits of the territorial sea was not resolved. Instead the extent
to which states may legally exercise jurisdiction beyond their coasts
seems more confused than before. This article summarizes the work
of the Geneva Conference regarding the breadth of the territorial sea
and assesses its current international legal status.
Until this century most maritime nations followed the long established practice of asserting sovereignty over a maritime belt extending only three miles from their coasts in deference to the principle
of the freedom of the seas. Gradually, however, the traditional threemile rule, long considered one of the hallowed rules of customary
international law, yielded in the face of important commercial considerations. Of increasing significance is the rising importance of fisheries, many, but not all of which lie more than three but less than
twelve miles from the coast.' Deviations extending more than 200
miles have been proclaimed by certain Latin American nations in
an effort to monopolize the exploitation of fisheries over a broad
area. Disagreements over the breadth of the territorial sea became
important enough to be considered by the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 in which the nations unsuccessfully attempted to reach
agreement.
t Associate Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1950,
Washington University; M.A. 1953, Ph.D. 1956, American University.
1. Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 CoIuM. L.
Rgv. 234, 244 (1959).
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After World War II the International Law Commission of the
United Nations resumed efforts to codify the various branches of
international law. Among other subjects considered ripe for codification, the ILC singled out both the regime of the high seas and
territorial waters at its first session in 1949. From then until 1956
it engaged in the formulation of rules governing the law of the sea
based on extensive investigation of state practice. A final draft report
presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1956 contained
a complete set of articles and commentaries concerning the various
aspects of the law of the sea, including the problem of the territorial sea.
The success of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea is due in large measure to the excellence of the ILC report. Unfortunately, the ILC draft that became the basis for the work of the
Geneva Conference contained no express agreement on the breadth
of the territorial sea. Recognizing the lack of uniformity with regard
to the practice of states, the ILC expressed the opinion that international law does not permit extension of the territorial sea beyond
twelve miles. While this statement represented a clear denunciation
of recent Latin American extensions beyond twelve miles, it did not
bring any measure of clarification with respect to a uniform legal
limit of the territorial sea. Indeed, this would have been impossible
in view of the fact that ". . . hardly more than twenty out of some
seventy-three coastal states adhered to the three-mile rule" at the
2
time the Geneva Conference convened.
The fact that only a minority of coastal states still adhere to the
three-mile rule is often overlooked by those who argue that this rule
is unalterably etched in custom. On the contrary, this once undisputed
custom of international sea law is changing. For this reason there
is an urgent need for securing revision of the three-mile rule to bring
it in conformity with international realities and, more significantly,
because of the growing importance of the territorial sea for the commercial policies of states.
As will be shown later, uncertainty has contributed to an important dispute within the past year between Great Britain and Iceland over the breadth of the territorial sea.
The Geneva Conference clearly revealed the interplay between
international politics and irfternational law in the sense that sharply
conflicting foreign policies prevented the emergence of a uniform maritime boundary embodied in a rule of law.
2. Sorensen, Law of the Sea, 519
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A small number of Latin American states had advanced exaggerated claims of sovereignty over waters extending 200 miles beyond
their coasts. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru had advanced these claims
in order to restrict the exploitation of fisheries off their shores to
their own nationals. Canada and Iceland wanted an extension to
twelve miles in order to prevent the depletion of their fisheries by
foreign fishing vessels while India, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Korea,
and South Viet Nam wanted an extension of the three-mile rule in
order to restrict Japanese fishing vessels. 3 The Philippines and Indonesia asserted special rights for their own archipelagoes. International
acceptance of these rights would have transformed large areas of high
seas into internal waters and would have closed important navigation
and aerial routes between India, Australia and New Zealand.' Finally,
a heated dispute over Israel's right of passage through the Strait of
Tiran connecting the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea prompted several
Arab states to vote in favor of a Soviet proposal for extending the
territorial sea to twelve miles. 5
The United States delegation argued in favor of the retention of
the three-mile limit and was supported by most of the European
coastal states. The basis for this position rested primarily on certain
security considerations rather than the long established practice of
the three-mile rule. In essence the American position constituted a
reaffirmation of the historic principle of the freedom of the seas.
Arthur Dean, chairman of the United States delegation, elucidated this position in a recent article in Foreign Affairs in which he
asserted that an extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles, as
advocated by several states at the Geneva Conference, would reduce
the efficiency of American naval power by barring the United States
fleet from waters formerly considered to be part of the high seas. 6
In the Aegean, eastern Mediterranean, and the seas around Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Japan, an extension of each island's territorial sea
would restrict the operational ability of the fleet. Such an extension
would have impeded the landing of American troops in Lebanon and
would seriously restrict implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine in
other trouble spots in the Middle East. In the Far East access of the
United States Seventh Fleet to Formosa and the China Seas would
3. Dean, Freedom of the Seas, 37 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 83, 87 (1958).
4. Id. at 88.
5. Id. at 86. The legal right of Israel to use the Strait of Tiran was affirmed
in article 16 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea. This article forbids the
suspension of innocent passage of foreign ships through straits normally used for
international navigation between two parts of the high seas.
6. Id. at 90.
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be jeopardized. A line drawn twelve miles off the coast of mainland
China or the island of Formosa would mean that American ships in
those areas protecting Formosa, Quemoy, and Matsu would be violating territorial waters rather than occupying the high seas. For
this reason, of course, the United States does not recognize as legal
the declaration by the People's Republic of China of an extension of
its territorial sea to twelve miles effective as of September 4, 1958.
Extension of the territorial sea would also disrupt air operations
inasmuch as the air space over territorial sea has always been considered subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state unless such
state by treaty or consent permits an exception. Both commercial and
freight aircraft operations as well as military operations of the leading air states would have to be curtailed pending the conclusion of
new international agreements allowing passage over the territorial sea.
A plausible argument presented by the United States concerned
the effect of an extension of the territorial sea on the law of war and
neutrality. In the event of war, neutrals would be hard put to detect
belligerent submarines submerged outside the three-mile limit and
violations of neutrality would be increased. While submarines cannot
operate effectively within the three-mile limit because of the greater
possibility of detection, if the territorial sea were extended to twelve
miles neutrals would have difficulty in patrolling this greater expanse
of sea in order to enforce their neutrality. Although article 14 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea requires submarines when navigating
in a territorial sea to stay on the surface and show their flag, it is
unlikely that belligerent submarines would obey the law in time of war
at the risk of detection and charges of neutrality violation. Under
such conditions, belligerent submarines would find a convenient haven
of escape from enemy surface vessels and antisubmarine aircraft which
could not legally pursue such submarines without violating the territory of a neutral coastal state.
Since an extension of the territorial sea would thus probably result in an increase in violations of neutrality, the effect of such violations would be greatly disadvantageous to the United States in the
event of a future conflict with the Soviet Union. With a marked numerical superiority in submarines, the Soviet Union would be able
to impede effectively American and allied shipping destined for neutral
ports. This is one important reason why the Soviet Union adheres
to a twelve-mile limit. Moreover, if a neutral state actually favored
the United States without legally joining in the hostilities, as was
the case with Ireland during World War II, the Soviet Union would
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be able to take countermeasures by discharging missiles while submerged under the territorial sea of the neutral where chances of detection would be minimal. Such considerations as mentioned above
were not explicitly articulated by the United States at the Conference,
but they underlie the whole American argument regarding the ease
with which violations of neutrality could be perpetrated by extension
of the territorial sea to twelve miles.
Despite the reasonableness of the American argument, smaller
powers were not overly impressed, perhaps since such an argument
may have inadvertently contributed "to a 'great power complex' in
the minds of small states." '
In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom voiced
similar security considerations by circulating charts to show how an
extension of the territorial sea from three to twelve miles would close
off a great number of important sea lanes not now subject to the
sovereignty of any state.8 Unfortunately, the emphasis on security
considerations by the maritime states had the effect ".

.

. of strengthen-

ing opposition to the three-miles rule by those states, belonging to
the Soviet as well as to the Afro-Asian group, which are antagonistic
to the naval supremacy of the Western powers." 9
When it became apparent that the majority of states represented
at the Conference were unwilling to support the three-mile rule, the
United States made a compromise proposal in which it abandoned
the three-mile standard but did not concede a twelve-mile limit. The
United States proposed that the territorial sea be extended to a maximum breadth of six miles and that the coastal state should have jurisdiction with respect to fisheries in a contiguous zone up to twelve
miles from the coast. It represented an effort to consider the interests
of such states as Canada, Iceland, Korea, and the Philippines who
were most concerned with preserving exclusive rights over fisheries.
However, the United States proposal contained one provision that made
it unacceptable to these states: foreign fishermen who had fished in
the area of the contiguous zone for the last five years might continue
to do so indefinitely. 10 The application of fishery rights within a contiguous zone constituted an attempt to enlarge the law of nations
regarding that zone. Although customary international law has long
recognized that coastal states may exercise sovereignty beyond their
territorial sea for the purpose of enforcing sanitary, customs, immi7. Jessup, supra note 1 at 239, n. 32.
8. Sorensen, supra note 2 at 245.
9. Ibid.
10. Sorensen, supra note 2 at 247.
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gration, and fiscal regulations, the question of exclusive fishing rights
within the contiguous zone has never been sanctioned by international
law.
The United States proposal for a compromise on the breadth of
the territorial sea failed to secure enough votes for adoption. Subsequent proposals by other states to break the deadlock were also unsuccessful. The only definitive accomplishment with regard to the
breadth of the territorial sea consisted in the incorporation into the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of an
article of the ILC draft, namely, that international law does not recognize as legal extensions of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles from
the coast.
In view of the lack of international agreement regarding the
breadth of the territorial sea, it is impossible to state definitively that
claims of jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit are illegal except
insofar as they exceed twelve miles (assuming, of course, that a sufficient number of states ratify the Convention to place it legally in force).
It therefore follows that one could not argue with any substantial
justification that since the three-mile rule has not been superseded by
a new standard it is still the legal standard for the international community. The latter view was not supported by the majority of the
members of the International Law Commission in its report on the
law of the territorial sea even though certain members of the Commission insisted on this view; moreover, the Commission asserted
that extensions between three and twelve miles were not to be considered breaches of international law." The ILC, of course, has no
authority to make international law, but its opinions are highly respected by statesmen and scholars.
The International Law Commission, therefore, supports the
opinion of the writer regarding the current legal status of the breadth
of the territorial sea. This opinion is based on the contention that
since only a minority of states accept the three-mile rule, this constitutes evidence that the rule is changing despite the fact that no revision has been incorporated into a written rule of law.
The position of the United States with regard to the breadth of
the territorial sea reflects the attitude taken at the Conference by those
states still adhering to the three-mile limit. On March 11, 1958,
Arthur Dean asserted that:
". .. Unilateral acts of States claiming greater territorial
seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international
11. 2

YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
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law but are indeed in conflict with the universally accepted principle of freedom of the seas. .

.

. We have made it clear that in

our view there is no obligation on the part of States adhering to
the 3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other states
to a greater breadth of the territorial sea. .. ."

12

While legally there may be no obligation on the part of the United
States to recognize claims of territorial sea beyond three miles, it may
be contended that on moral ground the United States cannot completely disregard claims of from four to six miles. The United States
compromise proposal of six miles submitted to the Geneva Conference
reveals the willingness of the United States to abandon the three-mile
standard.
Moreover, it is at least controversial, as indicated by the opinion
of the International Law Commission cited above, that unilateral acts
of states claiming territorial seas from three to twelve miles constitute
violations of international law. While such acts may not be sanctioned
by any principle of international law, it would be unpractical to insist
on the retention of a custom of international law which the majority
of states do not acknowledge. Even if it is admitted that such acts
are encroachments on the principle of the freedom of the seas, they
affect that principle only slightly except in the case of the obviously
illegal claims of three Latin American states.
If international law is to fulfill its function of regulating the
interests of states through the institution of mutually acceptable restraints, it must be adjusted from time to time in accordance with
changing conditions. That this adjustment may be contrary to the
national interests of the United States and the other nations adhering
to the three-mile rule cannot be denied. Certainly, the American arguments in favor of the retention of the three-mile rule are logical and
persuasive, but they cannot be effectively maintained so long as the
majority of states disagree. This appears to be the same conclusion
reached by Professor Philip Jessup, a leading authority in the field
of international maritime law. Professor Jessup argues that:
"... It is perfectly clear as a matter of international realities that
this limit [three-mile] will not prevail on all the shores of the
oceans. The United States, Japan, and others may continue to
maintain it for themselves ...but they will not be in a position

to compel other states to follow suit. This is true because by and
large, they will not follow the unfortunate recent example of the
United Kingdom by using their navies to compel smaller States
to accept the three mile limit. . ... Under such circumstances,
12. Dean, supra note 3 at 91.
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compromise is clearly indicated. The situation is a challenge to
the diplomatic skill of the United States, which is bound to gain
from international agreement and bound to suffer from the continuance of a semi-anarchic condition." 13
The failure of the Geneva Conference to produce agreement on
the breadth of the territorial sea soon contributed to a serious international dispute involving Great Britain and Iceland. In September,
1958, Iceland proclaimed a twelve-mile limit to safeguard the preservation of fisheries off her coasts from British and European trawlers.
Despite protests from Great Britain and other nations, Iceland refused
to yield to pressure to rescind or curtail the new limit. While other
nations withdrew their fishing boats in compliance with the new limit,

Great Britain refused and asserted the traditional right of British
trawlers to fish up to the previous four-mile limit. British left four
trawlers within the new twelve-mile limit and dispatched four frigates
of the Royal Navy to protect them. While no shots have been fired,
the dispute continues not only to plague relations between the two
countries but also to damage the NATO alliance of which Iceland is
a key member because of its strategic location. The conflict has proved
a timely issue for Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union immediately
recognized the new Icelandic limit and used the British action to undermine the loyalty of Iceland to NATO.
The dispute between Iceland and Great Britain is complicated
not only by differing legal interpretations regarding the new zone but
also by the fact that fish and fish products are of only marginal importance to Great Britain whereas this industry is of vital significance
to the economy of Iceland.
While the British have urged that the dispute be adjudicated by
the International Court of Justice, it is unlikely that this body could
render an acceptable decision in view of the lack of uniformity regarding the breadth of the territorial sea. The dispute continues to serve
as an unfortunate byproduct of the failure of the Geneva Conference
to settle definitively the question of the breadth of the territorial sea.
What are the prospects for resolving the unsettled issue of the
breadth of the territorial sea? Prior to its adjournment, the Geneva
Conference adopted a resolution requesting the United Nations General
Assembly to study the question of calling a second conference to examine again the questions which had not been solved at the first
conference. During the thirteenth session of the General Assembly
13. Jessup, supra note 1 at 264.
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in 1958, the issue of a new conference was discussed and the General
Assembly agreed to hold another conference in the spring of 1960.14
When the new conference is convened, it is unlikely that the
three-mile rule will become the starting point for negotiations in view
of the willingness of the United States to compromise in favor of a
six-mile rule at the 1958 conference. It seems, therefore, that the
long cherished three-mile rule is being superseded by a wider limit
despite efforts by the United States and other coastal states to perpetuate it in the law of nations.
The solution of the controversial question of the breadth of the
territorial sea lies in the adoption of a legal standard representing a
compromise of the conflicting claims of states. This is the function
of law in the international community with regard to all controversial
subjects, but it is a function which ultimately depends on political
accommodation.
14. United Nations General Assembly Res. 1307, 13th Sess. (1958).
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